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Advance Release Opinions - Review and Analysis

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Advance Release Opinions – Appellate Court – September 21

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Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about divorce, professional negligence (legal malpractice), and worker’s compensation.

Divorce

Varoglu v. Sciarrino – Appellate Court affirmed trial court’s finding that Varoglu bought a condominium in Colorado for herself with proceeds of a loan secured by the marital home in Westport and trial court’s division of the equity in the marital home.

Professional Negligence (Legal Malpractice)

Dubinsky v. Black – Dubinsky claimed that Black failed to inform him that accepting a plea deal in his criminal case would preclude him from suing the police for malicious prosecution. Black denied any failure to inform, and asserted that Dubinsky could not win any malicious prosecution claim in any event because the police had probable cause for the arrest. Trial court granted Black summary judgment. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) malicious prosecution depends on absence of probable cause; (2) the police had probable cause; and (3) the fact that Dubinsky might have been able to successfully defend the criminal charges does not mean that the police lacked probable cause.

Worker’s Compensation

Dahle v. The Stop and Shop Supermarket Company, LLC – Dahle claimed that she was entitled to temporary total disability benefits without the social security offset because an improper prior decision and negligence in handling her claim had delayed her treatment, which was the only reason she was subject to the offset. Appellate Court affirmed board, finding that (1) board properly declined to consider “past incorrect evidence” and “new evidence” about the prior decision because that decision became final when Dahle failed to appeal it to the Appellate Court; (2) contrary to Dahle’s contention, commissioner never found that her treatment had been delayed; and (3) social security offset cannot be waived.

Advance Release Opinions – Supreme Court – September 14

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Review of a Connecticut Supreme Court advance release opinion about worker’s compensation.

Worker’s Compensation

Filosi v. Electric Boat Corporation – Filosi filed claims under the state Worker’s Compensation Act and the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. While his worker’s comp claim was pending, a federal administrative law judge awarded Filosi benefits under the Longshore Act. Back in the worker’s comp proceeding, Filosi argued that the federal decision collaterally estopped Electric Boat from contesting worker’s comp eligibility. Electric Boat argued that it was not collaterally estopped because the causation standard under the Longshore Act is less stringent than the standard under the Worker’s Compensation Act. So, Electric Boat argued, it should be allowed to defend the claim under the more stringent worker’s comp standard. Commissioner dismissed Filosi’s claim on findings that Electric Boat was not collaterally estopped and Filosi had failed to establish causation. Board reversed. Supreme Court affirmed board, finding Electric Boat “collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of causation under the state act because the record of the Longshore Act proceedings indicates that the administrative law judge employed the substantial factor standard that governs in the state forum.”

Advance Release Opinions – Appellate Court – August 31

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Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about divorce, insurance, and worker’s compensation.

Divorce

Merk-Gould v. Gould – Appellate Court reversed alimony award and division of certain investments because trial court’s finding as to defendant’s earning capacity was clearly erroneous and trial court abused its discretion in valuing the investments at acquisition cost, rather than value at date of dissolution. Because the alimony award was interwoven with everything else, the remand requires the trial court to reconsider all financial and property orders.

Insurance

Vaccaro v. D’Angelo – Vaccaro was Boileau’s lawyer in a personal injury action. D’Angelo was Boileau’s chiropractor who had a letter of protection. After the case settled, Boileau disputed whether he had to pay D’Angelo for treatments that exceeded the maximum number under Boileau’s health insurance plan. Boileau said that he didn’t have to pay because the provider contract between D’Angelo and Boileau’s health insurance plan required D’Angelo to obtain Boileau’s acknowledgment of financial responsibility before each extra treatment and D’Angelo did not do that. Vaccaro started an interpleader action. Trial court found for D’Angelo. Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that the acknowledgment form was only required for non-covered services, and treatments that exceeded the maximum number were not “non-covered services.” Boileau had some other claims too, but Appellate Court declined to consider them as inadequately briefed.

Worker’s Compensation

Diaz v. Department of Social Services – Dueling doctors on the question of whether lack of proper ergonomics at the workplace, or pre-existing conditions unrelated to the employment, triggered Diaz’s back surgery. Commissioner dismissed. Board affirmed. Appellate Court also affirmed, finding that (1) board was bound to accept commissioner’s decision as to which medical evidence he found more persuasive; (2) board properly affirmed commissioner’s denial of Diaz’s motion to correct his findings because Diaz really just asked the commissioner to substitute her conclusions for his own; and (3) board did not abuse its discretion in denying Diaz’s motion to submit additional evidence because that additional evidence was not new.

Advance Release Opinions – Supreme Court – July 27

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Reviews of Connecticut Supreme Court advance release opinions about attorney discipline and worker’s compensation.

Attorney Discipline

D’Attilo v. Statewide Grievance Committee – D’Attilo started an action in Superior Court (1) seeking a writ of mandamus directing local grievance panels to reverse their dismissals of grievance complaints that D’Attilo had filed against five lawyers; and (2) asking Superior Court to oust the Statewide Grievance Committee and take control of grievances still pending against two other lawyers. Superior Court dismissed the action for lack of standing because D’Attilo was neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved. Supreme Court affirmed, adopting Superior Court’s memorandum of decision.

Worker’s Compensation

Callaghan v. Car Parts International, LLC – Prior to 2011, if an injured worker recovered from a third-party, the employer was entitled to be reimbursed from that recovery for any worker’s compensation benefits that the employer had paid to the injured worker. If any of the recovery remained after reimbursing the employer, the employer enjoyed a “moratorium” on payment of benefits in the future, up to the amount of the remaining recovery. In 2011, the legislature amended the statute, CGS § 31-293(a), to provide that one-third of any recovery from a third-party “shall inure solely to the benefit of the employee.” In other words, the employee is entitled to one-third of any recovery from a third-party. The question on appeal was whether the moratorium applied to that one-third. The Supreme Court confirmed that it does not. The employee gets to keep the one-third regardless of whether the employer pays any future benefits.

Advance Release Opinions – Appellate Court – July 20

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Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about civil procedure, contracts (third-party beneficiary), easement, and worker’s compensation.

Civil Procedure

Magee Avenue, LLC v. Lima Ceramic Tile, LLC – Action for breach of lease agreement and unjust enrichment against Lima and Lima’s manager. Lima’s manager moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract counts but did not file a supporting affidavit until the day before the hearing. At the hearing, Magee objected to the affidavit because it was filed too late to be considered and was not based on personal knowledge. Trial court permitted Lima’s manager to testify. It then granted Lima’s manager summary judgment on the breach of contract counts and the unjust enrichment count (trial court’s decision said the complaint is “stricken” as to Lima’s manager, but Appellate Court concluded it was really summary judgment). Appellate Court reversed, finding that trial court (1) improperly considered Lima’s manager’s affidavit because it was filed too late under Practice Book § 17-45; (2) improperly permitted and considered Lima’s manager’s live testimony because that necessarily required trial court to make credibility determinations and factual findings, which necessarily precluded summary judgment; and (3) improperly rendered summary judgment on the unjust enrichment count because Lima’s manager’s written motion did not request summary judgment on that count.

Contracts (Third-Party Beneficiary)

Hilario’s Truck Center, LLC v. Rinaldi – Appellate Court affirmed trial court’s decision that Hilario’s lacked standing to sue Nationwide directly for towing and storage services it rendered for Rinaldi after she crashed her car because Hilario’s was not a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract between Nationwide and Rinaldi.

Easement

Davis v. Property Owners Association at Moodus Lake Shores, Inc. – Appellate Court affirmed (1) trial court’s decision to permit defense experts to testify despite the arguably late disclosure because plaintiffs failed to show any prejudice; and (2) trial court’s denial of an easement by implication because the evidence showed that plaintiffs could access their property without crossing defendant’s (Appellate Court actually adopted the trial court’s memorandum of decision on this point, but Appellate Court’s decision earlier references the access evidence).

Worker’s Compensation

Barker v. All Roofs by Dominic – Bridgeport was “principal employer” under CGS § 31-291 and thus responsible for benefits for the employee of an uninsured subcontractor who was injured while repairing a roof on a Bridgeport-owned building because (1) our Supreme Court had already confirmed that a municipality can be a principal employer under § 31-291; (2) the statute creating the Second Injury Fund, which compensates injured employees of uninsured employers, did not expressly or implicitly repeal or modify § 31-291; and (3) commissioner properly concluded that the roofing repairs to the Bridgeport-owned building were part of Bridgeport’s “business” under § 31-291, since CGS § 7-148 obligated Bridgeport to repair its property.

 

Advance Release Opinions – Supreme Court – June 1, 8, 22 and 29

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Reviews of Connecticut Supreme Court advance release opinions about civil procedure, election law, and worker’s compensation.

Civil Procedure

Samelko v. Kingstone Insurance Company – Kingstone is a New York insurance company that issued a business car insurance policy in New York covering a business located in New York and a vehicle garaged in New York. The coverage territory was the United States. Insured driver collided with the Samelkos in Connecticut. The Samelkos sued the insured. Kingstone declined to defend. Default judgment entered in the Samelkos’ favor, which Kingstone declined to pay. The Samelkos then exercised their subrogation rights and sued Kingstone. Trial court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Kingstone had no contacts with Connecticut and thus no notice that it might be sued in Connecticut. Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the policy had a nationwide coverage territory (1) the contract was “to be performed” in Connecticut under our corporate long arm statute; (2) it was foreseeable that Kingstone would have to perform in Connecticut, which provided the necessary minimum contacts with Connecticut; and (3) it was fair and reasonable to require Kingstone to defend itself in Connecticut.

Election Law

Arciniega v. Feliciano – Reversed. Candidate 1 lacked standing to attack validity of petition that led to Candidate 2’s inclusion on the ballot in a primary election because Candidate 1 was not aggrieved “by the ruling of an election official” as the statute required. Specifically, though Candidate 2’s address was wrong on the petition, there was no statute requiring an election official to reject a petition containing an inaccurate address. Since there was no rejection requirement, there was no “ruling” in accepting the petition with the inaccurate address. Since there had to be a ruling before there could be standing to complain about the ruling, there was no standing.

Cook-Littman v. Board of Selectman – Reversed. Town’s charter, not state statute, set procedure for filling a vacancy on the board of selectman because it is a matter of purely local concern.

Worker’s Compensation

Williams v. New Haven – Worker received benefits, returned to work, but was ultimately terminated for worker’s compensation fraud. Worker filed a grievance, which the parties arbitrated under the collective bargaining agreement. Worker lost both the arbitration and the motion in Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award. Meanwhile, worker filed a statutory wrongful discharge claim under CGS § 31-290a with the worker’s compensation commission. City moved to dismiss, arguing that since worker was pursuing a statutory wrongful termination claim before the worker’s compensation commission instead of a “court of competent jurisdiction” as required by CGS § 31-51bb and Genovese, the arbitration collaterally estopped the wrongful termination claim. Commissioner denied the motion. Review board affirmed. Supreme Court also affirmed, finding that (1) “court of competent jurisdiction” includes worker’s compensation commission for purposes of § 31-51bb and Genovese; (2) Superior Court motion to vacate the arbitration award did not satisfy § 31-51bb’s requirement of judicial review of statutory claim; and (3) § 31-51bb and Genovese allow the worker to pursue the same or a substantially similar claim after the adverse arbitration decision.

 

Advance Release Opinions – June 29

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Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about divorce, mortgage foreclosure, and worker’s compensation.

Divorce

Magsig v. Magsig – Trial court denied plaintiff’s contempt motion about compliance with an indemnity provision of the dissolution decree. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) trial court considered defendant’s testimony about his understanding of indemnity provision solely on the wilfulness issue, not in interpreting provision; and (2) indemnity provision could not be interpreted to protect plaintiff against liability, as opposed to loss, because the liability was already extant at the time of the decree.

Mortgage Foreclosure

HSBC Bank USA, N.A., Trustee v. Hallums – Per curiam opinion affirming that (1) plaintiff had standing because borrower did not rebut the presumption of ownership arising from plaintiff’s holder status; (2) borrower’s bankruptcy discharge did not preclude foreclosure of the mortgage; and (3) borrower’s claims about the best evidence rule and clean hands doctrine were “baseless.”

Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC – Jenzack took an assignment of a note that was guaranteed. The guaranty was secured by a mortgage on the guarantor’s home. Trial court entered a judgment of strict foreclosure as to guarantor’s home. Guarantor raised three arguments on appeal. First argument was that Jenzack lacked standing because the assignment did not specifically assign the guaranty. Appellate Court rejected this argument because assignment of the note automatically carried with it assignment of guaranty. Second argument was that document showing loan balance on date of assignment was inadmissible hearsay because it came from a document that assignor had given to Jenzack. Appellate Court agreed and reversed, finding that business records exception is for records made in the ordinary course of business, not records received in the ordinary course of business. Third argument was that Jenzack was not entitled to attorney’s fees because the attorney’s bills were addressed to a party other than Jenzack. Appellate Court rejected this argument because there was testimony that Jenzack had had problems receiving its mail, and the “someone else” was added to insure that it would receive the attorney’s bills.

Worker’s Compensation

Mickucka v. St. Lucian’s Residence, Inc. – Defendants had been paying plaintiff temporary total incapacity benefits. Defendants then filed a form 36, seeking to discontinue benefits because plaintiff had achieved maximum medical improvement. Commissioner approved the form 36 at an informal hearing. Plaintiff objected, and sent a notice of formal hearing about “Form 36/Discontinuation of Benefits.” At the formal hearing, plaintiff attempted to present evidence that plaintiff was entitled to benefits for a vocational total disability even if she had achieved maximum medical improvement, i.e., an Osterlund claim. Because that was not part of plantiff’s notice of hearing, commissioner precluded the evidence, but invited plaintiff to pursue an Osterlund claim in a separate, future hearing. Commissioner found that plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement and had work capacity. Without pursuing the Osterlund claim, plaintiff appealed to the board, arguing that the commissioner could not rule on the form 36 without considering whether plaintiff was still temporarily totally disabled. Board affirmed. On appeal to the Appellate Court, plaintiff claimed that she was denied due process when commissioner precluded her from presenting evidence of a lack of work capacity. Appellate Court rejected that claim, finding that commissioner precluded plaintiff from presenting Osterlund evidence when the form 36 was the only issue noticed; commissioner gave plaintiff opportunity to present he Osterlund evidence at a separate, future hearing. And, Appellate Court noted that allowing plaintiff to present Osterlund evidence at the form 36 hearing would have deprived defendants of due process because they were not given proper notice. Appellate Court rejected as unripe plaintiff’s claim that she was totally disabled because that would have been the issue in the Osterlund claim, which plaintiff had not pursued.

Advance Release Opinions – May 24

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Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about civil procedure, governmental immunity, mortgage foreclosure, and worker’s compensation.

Civil Procedure

Lynn v. Bosco – Board ousted chairman of privately-held company. Attempting to regain control, chairman offered to buy shares from other shareholders. No one accepted. Later, a shareholder offered to sell shares to the new chairman, not the ousted chairman. Instead of buying them directly, new chairman and board had company buy them, and turn around and sell them to the new chairman and other board members. Ousted chairman started declaratory judgment action against board members individually, essentially alleging that they violated his preemptive rights as a shareholder to buy the shares himself before the company could. Ousted chairman did not name company as a defendant. New chairman and board members moved to strike, claiming that company was a necessary party to an action asserting that company violated preemptive rights. Court granted the motion. When ousted chairman repleaded, he did name company as a defendant, but he did not allege any wrongdoing by, or seek relief from, the company. After trial, court ordered the board members to return the shares they had purchased to the company, and ordered the company to reimburse the board members for the returned shares. Appellate Court affirmed the return-the-shares order, but reversed the reimbursement order, finding that the trial court lacked authority to impose a remedy on the company because none of the pleadings contained any allegation against the company, sought any relief from it, or otherwise put the company on notice that a claim was being made against it.

Governmental Immunity

Perez v. University of Connecticut – Student fell on ice in a UConn parking lot. General Assembly waived sovereign immunity under CGS § 4-159. Student claimed action to jury list. Trial court granted state’s motion to strike the jury claim because CGS § 4-160(f) requires a bench trial when sovereign immunity is waived under § 4-159. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) student had no constitutional right to a jury in action against the state; and (2) neither § 4-159 nor § 4-160 authorized a jury trial against the state.

Mortgage Foreclosure

Tedesco v. Agolli – Per curiam decision affirming judgment of foreclosure by sale. Appellate Court adopted trial court’s memorandum of decision, which Appellate Court appended to its decision. I didn’t read the trial court’s decision, but here’s what I gleaned from the Appellate Court’s: Apparently Tedesco’s pension plan loaned money to a limited liability company composed of Agolli and some others. The company secured the loan with mortgages on company property. Agolli seems to have claimed that the people who had signed the loan documents for the company did not have a meeting of the minds with Tedesco, authority to bind the company, and were under duress. Trial court and Appellate Court rejected those claims.

Worker’s Compensation

Clements v. Aramark Corporation – Not sure I completely get this one. Worker fell and hit her head on the ground after fainting due to health conditions unrelated to her job. Commissioner and board denied benefits, concluding that injuries arose out of worker’s personal infirmity, not her employment. Appellate Court reversed, finding that worker’s injuries from falling at her workplace did arise out of her employment, even though the personal infirmity that caused her to fall did not.

Advance Release Opinions – May 11

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Reviews of Connecticut Supreme Court advance release opinions about civil procedure and worker’s compensation.

Civil Procedure

Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank – Reversed. Connecticut couple hired California company to stage their Connecticut home for sale. Payment dispute arose. Company obtained default judgment against couple in California. Company then started Connecticut action to enforce the foreign judgment, and for breach of contract and quantum meruit. Trial court found for Company against husband on the California judgment, for wife against Company on the foreign judgment, and for Company against wife on the breach of contract claim. Appellate Court affirmed. Supreme Court found that Appellate Court should have dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment against husband since the trial court did not determine the breach of contract or quantum meruit claims against him. Those claims are legally inconsistent, or mutually exclusive, with each other, but not with the foreign judgment claim. So, the judgment against wife on the breach of contract claim automatically disposed of the quantum meruit claim against her. But, the judgment against husband on the foreign judgment did not dispose of either breach of contract or quantum meruit against him, meaning there was no final, appealable judgment against husband.

Worker’s Compensation

MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti – Affirmed. While MacDermid’s employee, Leonetti suffered an on-the-job injury and filed a worker’s compensation claim. Five years later, and before the worker’s compensation claim was finally resolved, MacDermid discharged Leonetti. The parties entered into a severance agreement, under which MacDermid paid Leonetti some $70,000, and Leonetti released all claims against MacDermid. The worker’s compensation commission ruled that the release did not include Leonetti’s worker’s compensation claim. Supreme Court affirmed. While that appeal was pending, MacDermid started the instant action against Leonetti, essentially claiming through a variety of theories that if Leonetti wanted his worker’s compensation claim, he would have to give back the $70,000 severance payment. Jury found for MacDermid on its unjust enrichment claim. Supreme Court affirmed, finding that (1) MacDermid’s claim not barred by collateral estoppel because there was no identity of issues between the worker’s compensation matter and the unjust enrichment claim; (2) Leonetti failed to preserve for appeal his claim that the worker’s compensation act, the severance agreement, or public policy barred MacDermid’s claim; (3) Leonetti failed to adequately brief the harm that he claims to have suffered from improper jury instructions; (4) the general verdict rule bars Leonetti’s argument about the jury instructions in any event; and (5) Leonetti failed to challenge all of the trial court’s bases for excluding certain exhibits, and failed to adequately brief the harm he supposedly suffered from its exclusion of another.

Advance Release Opinions – March 23

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Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court’s advance release opinions about administrative law, civil procedure, contracts, deed restriction, governmental immunity, visitation, and worker’s compensation. I do not review the Court’s advance release opinions about criminal law and habeas corpus. I also do not review the Court’s per curiam decision affirming summary judgment for defendant in a spoliation of evidence and CUTPA case because there isn’t anything in the opinion to review (if you want to see for yourself, the case is Traylor v. Gambrell).

Administrative Law

Metropolitan District v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities – District is a municipal entity the legislature created in 1929 for water supply, waste management and regional planning. Commission is a state agency charged with enforcing statutes barring discrimination. District sought a declaratory judgment, injunction and writ of mandamus on allegations that Commission engaged in improper rulemaking and violated District’s due process rights regarding District’s alleged discriminatory hiring practices at issue in five proceedings before Commission. Trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that District could not yet pursue declaratory relief in Superior Court because it had to first seek that relief before Commission under CGS § 4-176, and it could not yet seek that relief before Commission because three of the five discriminatory hiring claims were still pending before Commission. Appellate Court also confirmed that the exhaustion requirement applied even when challenging Commission’s jurisdiction; the exception for futility or inadequacy of administrative remedy did not apply since there was no showing of futility or inadequacy; and the exception for due process claims under 42 USC 1983 did not apply because lack of an adequate legal remedy remains a condition to injunctive relief even when claim is made under that statute.

Civil Procedure

Ryan v. Cassella – Plaintiff brought collection action against “Paul Cascella dba CIA Integrated Marketing Systems” and trial court entered a judgment for plaintiff on defendant’s failure to appear. In attempting to examine the judgment debtor, plaintiff learned that, though the marshal had served defendant at the correct address, defendant’s name was actually Cassella, with a second “s” instead of a second “c”, and that his company’s name was actually Integrated Marketing Systems, Inc., with an “Inc.” and without “CIA.” Trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to correct the names. After the trial court’s articulations, Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) judgment was against Cassella individually, not against his company, so that correcting the company name did not add a new party; (2) CGS § 52-123 gave the trial court the authority to correct the misspellings because correcting names did not substitute a new party and neither party was prejudiced; (3) the four month limit for opening judgments did not preclude the trial court from correcting the misspellings; (4) trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to open and vacate the trial court’s decision on the motion to correct.

Contracts

Micek-Holt v. Papageorge – Lease-to-buy contract blew up for landlord-seller when tenant-buyer failed to close – in 2011 – but remained in the property without paying anything. Trial court ordering a closing on certain terms, and failing that, judgment to enter for plaintiff extinguishing defendant’s property interest, quieting title in plaintiff, and requiring defendant to pay $150/day use and occupancy. Appellate Court affirmed in a per curiam decision essentially adopting the trial court’s reasoning.

Deed Restriction

Bueno v. Firgeleski – A 1941 deed included a restrictive covenant limiting construction on the property to one house, within specified setbacks, and only if approved by grantor or his successors. Plaintiffs acquired the land in 2008, intending to subdivide into two lots – one for their own home and one for development. The deed into plaintiffs contains the restriction. Trial court declared the restrictions unenforceable because (1) its purpose had been frustrated by a permanent and substantial change in circumstances; (2) it had been abandoned by lack of enforcement; and (3) it benefits no land. Appellate Court affirmed, rejecting defendants’ claims that (1) the evidence did not support certain of the trial court’s factual findings; and (2) the trial court improperly went beyond the four corners of the deeds in interpreting them and misapplied the substantial change of circumstances test.

Governmental Immunity

McCarroll v. East Haven – Child fell from the ladder of a playscape at kindergarten allegedly because of a missing or loose bolt securing one of the rungs. Trial court granted defendant summary judgment, finding that the identifiable victim-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity did not apply because although the child was in identifiable class of victims, the harm was not imminent absent evidence that the missing or loose bolt was apparent to East Haven. Appellate Court affirmed, noting that “[w]hether the bolt was missing or loose, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the probability of the child being injured was so high that the defendant had a clear and unequivocal duty to act to prevent harm.”

Visitation

Nassra v. Nassra – Supervised-visitation provider started collection action in small claims court to recover unpaid fees. Small claims court found that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the action. Service provider then filed an appearance in the dissolution action and moved for an order of payment, which the trial court granted. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) service provider had standing because service provider had an oral contract with defendant and was injured when defendant did not pay; (2) six-year statute of limitations applied to the oral contract because the three-year statute applies only to executory oral contracts (neither party has fully performed and this oral contract was executed (service provider fully performed); and (3) trial court acted within its discretion in ordering defendant to pay service provider.

Worker’s Compensation

Binkowski v. Board of Education – Students assaulted Teacher and injured her. Teacher sued Board, alleging that Board acted “willfully and maliciously,” and intentionally inflicted emotional distress, by instituting a policy that led to the assault because it denied assistance to teachers confronted by violent and disruptive students. Trial court struck the complaint because it did not allege conduct to bring the action within an exception to worker’s compensation exclusivity. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that the complaint failed to allege conduct to bring her claim into the intentional tort exception under either the actual intent standard or the substantial certainty standard.