Advance Release Opinions – March 23

Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court’s advance release opinions about administrative law, civil procedure, contracts, deed restriction, governmental immunity, visitation, and worker’s compensation. I do not review the Court’s advance release opinions about criminal law and habeas corpus. I also do not review the Court’s per curiam decision affirming summary judgment for defendant in a spoliation of evidence and CUTPA case because there isn’t anything in the opinion to review (if you want to see for yourself, the case is Traylor v. Gambrell).

Administrative Law

Metropolitan District v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities – District is a municipal entity the legislature created in 1929 for water supply, waste management and regional planning. Commission is a state agency charged with enforcing statutes barring discrimination. District sought a declaratory judgment, injunction and writ of mandamus on allegations that Commission engaged in improper rulemaking and violated District’s due process rights regarding District’s alleged discriminatory hiring practices at issue in five proceedings before Commission. Trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that District could not yet pursue declaratory relief in Superior Court because it had to first seek that relief before Commission under CGS § 4-176, and it could not yet seek that relief before Commission because three of the five discriminatory hiring claims were still pending before Commission. Appellate Court also confirmed that the exhaustion requirement applied even when challenging Commission’s jurisdiction; the exception for futility or inadequacy of administrative remedy did not apply since there was no showing of futility or inadequacy; and the exception for due process claims under 42 USC 1983 did not apply because lack of an adequate legal remedy remains a condition to injunctive relief even when claim is made under that statute.

Civil Procedure

Ryan v. Cassella – Plaintiff brought collection action against “Paul Cascella dba CIA Integrated Marketing Systems” and trial court entered a judgment for plaintiff on defendant’s failure to appear. In attempting to examine the judgment debtor, plaintiff learned that, though the marshal had served defendant at the correct address, defendant’s name was actually Cassella, with a second “s” instead of a second “c”, and that his company’s name was actually Integrated Marketing Systems, Inc., with an “Inc.” and without “CIA.” Trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to correct the names. After the trial court’s articulations, Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) judgment was against Cassella individually, not against his company, so that correcting the company name did not add a new party; (2) CGS § 52-123 gave the trial court the authority to correct the misspellings because correcting names did not substitute a new party and neither party was prejudiced; (3) the four month limit for opening judgments did not preclude the trial court from correcting the misspellings; (4) trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to open and vacate the trial court’s decision on the motion to correct.

Contracts

Micek-Holt v. Papageorge – Lease-to-buy contract blew up for landlord-seller when tenant-buyer failed to close – in 2011 – but remained in the property without paying anything. Trial court ordering a closing on certain terms, and failing that, judgment to enter for plaintiff extinguishing defendant’s property interest, quieting title in plaintiff, and requiring defendant to pay $150/day use and occupancy. Appellate Court affirmed in a per curiam decision essentially adopting the trial court’s reasoning.

Deed Restriction

Bueno v. Firgeleski – A 1941 deed included a restrictive covenant limiting construction on the property to one house, within specified setbacks, and only if approved by grantor or his successors. Plaintiffs acquired the land in 2008, intending to subdivide into two lots – one for their own home and one for development. The deed into plaintiffs contains the restriction. Trial court declared the restrictions unenforceable because (1) its purpose had been frustrated by a permanent and substantial change in circumstances; (2) it had been abandoned by lack of enforcement; and (3) it benefits no land. Appellate Court affirmed, rejecting defendants’ claims that (1) the evidence did not support certain of the trial court’s factual findings; and (2) the trial court improperly went beyond the four corners of the deeds in interpreting them and misapplied the substantial change of circumstances test.

Governmental Immunity

McCarroll v. East Haven – Child fell from the ladder of a playscape at kindergarten allegedly because of a missing or loose bolt securing one of the rungs. Trial court granted defendant summary judgment, finding that the identifiable victim-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity did not apply because although the child was in identifiable class of victims, the harm was not imminent absent evidence that the missing or loose bolt was apparent to East Haven. Appellate Court affirmed, noting that “[w]hether the bolt was missing or loose, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the probability of the child being injured was so high that the defendant had a clear and unequivocal duty to act to prevent harm.”

Visitation

Nassra v. Nassra – Supervised-visitation provider started collection action in small claims court to recover unpaid fees. Small claims court found that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the action. Service provider then filed an appearance in the dissolution action and moved for an order of payment, which the trial court granted. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) service provider had standing because service provider had an oral contract with defendant and was injured when defendant did not pay; (2) six-year statute of limitations applied to the oral contract because the three-year statute applies only to executory oral contracts (neither party has fully performed and this oral contract was executed (service provider fully performed); and (3) trial court acted within its discretion in ordering defendant to pay service provider.

Worker’s Compensation

Binkowski v. Board of Education – Students assaulted Teacher and injured her. Teacher sued Board, alleging that Board acted “willfully and maliciously,” and intentionally inflicted emotional distress, by instituting a policy that led to the assault because it denied assistance to teachers confronted by violent and disruptive students. Trial court struck the complaint because it did not allege conduct to bring the action within an exception to worker’s compensation exclusivity. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that the complaint failed to allege conduct to bring her claim into the intentional tort exception under either the actual intent standard or the substantial certainty standard.