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Advance Release Opinions - Review and Analysis

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Governmental Immunity

Advance Release Opinions – Supreme Court – September 7

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Reviews of Connecticut Supreme Court advance release opinions about eminent domain and governmental immunity.

Eminent Domain

Hartford v. CBV Parking Hartford, LLC – Supreme Court confirmed that Hartford underpaid – by some $2.8 million – for property it condemned near what was to become Dunkin Donuts Park. Supreme Court did reverse the trial court’s post-judgment interest award, finding that because the trial court did not award interest in its original judgment, CGS § 37-3c allowed interest only at the default rate, not a “reasonable and just” rate.

Governmental Immunity

Smith v. Rudolph – Plaintiff does not have a right to a jury trial for a car accident with a state-owned vehicle because the statute waiving sovereign immunity for such claims (CGS § 52-556) does not expressly provide for it.

 

Advance Release Opinions – Appellate Court – August 9

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Reviews of Appellate Court opinions about custody and visitation, governmental immunity, and personal injury.

Custody and Visitation

In re Joheli V. – Trial court terminated father’s parental rights because he failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of Joheli, he could assume a responsible position in her life. Father appealed, claiming that trial court based its decision solely upon father’s incarceration and pending trial for allegedly sexually assaulting Joheli. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that father’s incarceration was one factor (and properly so), but not the sole factor, in the trial court’s decision.

Governmental Immunity

Drabik v. Thomas – AT&T notified the FCC that it was thinking about putting a cell tower on Drabik’s property. FCC notified the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut. The tribe objected because the tower would “impact the view shed” for “substantial stone groupings” that were of “traditional religious and cultural significance to the tribe.” Drabik asked the tribe for more information about the stone groupings but the tribe did not respond. So, Drabik filed a petition for a bill of discovery, a device to obtain evidence for use in an action other than the one in which the discovery is sought. Trial court granted the tribe’s motion to dismiss Drabik’s petition on the ground of tribal sovereign immunity. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that tribal sovereign immunity applied to a prelitigation bill of discovery just as it did to an actual litigation, and that the immunity extended to the individual members of the tribe from whom Drabik sought the discovery because they were acting within the scope of their tribal authority.

Palosz v. Greenwich – Board of Education not entitled to sovereign immunity for claims alleging failure to comply with antibullying policy because sovereign immunity protects the state alone, and Board acts for the municipality, not the state, in enforcing antibullying policy. More specifically, a board of education acts for the state when it performs duties delegated to it by the state, and for the municipality when it performs duties delegated to it by the municipality. Though the state delegated creation of an anti-bullying policy to the boards of education, it delegated enforcement to the municipalities. Greenwich delegated its enforcement duties to Board.

Personal Injury

Farmer-Lanctot v. Shand – Farmer-Lanctot jumped out of the way of Shand’s car and was injured. Shand denied he was negligent and asserted contributory negligence. Trial court denied Farmer-Lanctot’s request for certain charges. General verdict for Shand. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) under the general verdict rule, the verdict stands if any ground for the verdict is proper; (2) Shand’s denial of negligence was possibly a ground for the verdict; (3) Farmer-Lanctot’s only attack on that ground was her claim that the trial court should have charged the jury on the driver’s duty to yield to pedestrians when making a right turn; (4) trial court properly declined to give that charge because the facts did not support it; and (5) since the trial court properly declined to give the charge, the general verdict rule required Appellate Court to presume that the jury found Shand not negligent, which was sufficient to affirm.

 

Advance Release Opinions – May 24

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Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about civil procedure, governmental immunity, mortgage foreclosure, and worker’s compensation.

Civil Procedure

Lynn v. Bosco – Board ousted chairman of privately-held company. Attempting to regain control, chairman offered to buy shares from other shareholders. No one accepted. Later, a shareholder offered to sell shares to the new chairman, not the ousted chairman. Instead of buying them directly, new chairman and board had company buy them, and turn around and sell them to the new chairman and other board members. Ousted chairman started declaratory judgment action against board members individually, essentially alleging that they violated his preemptive rights as a shareholder to buy the shares himself before the company could. Ousted chairman did not name company as a defendant. New chairman and board members moved to strike, claiming that company was a necessary party to an action asserting that company violated preemptive rights. Court granted the motion. When ousted chairman repleaded, he did name company as a defendant, but he did not allege any wrongdoing by, or seek relief from, the company. After trial, court ordered the board members to return the shares they had purchased to the company, and ordered the company to reimburse the board members for the returned shares. Appellate Court affirmed the return-the-shares order, but reversed the reimbursement order, finding that the trial court lacked authority to impose a remedy on the company because none of the pleadings contained any allegation against the company, sought any relief from it, or otherwise put the company on notice that a claim was being made against it.

Governmental Immunity

Perez v. University of Connecticut – Student fell on ice in a UConn parking lot. General Assembly waived sovereign immunity under CGS § 4-159. Student claimed action to jury list. Trial court granted state’s motion to strike the jury claim because CGS § 4-160(f) requires a bench trial when sovereign immunity is waived under § 4-159. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) student had no constitutional right to a jury in action against the state; and (2) neither § 4-159 nor § 4-160 authorized a jury trial against the state.

Mortgage Foreclosure

Tedesco v. Agolli – Per curiam decision affirming judgment of foreclosure by sale. Appellate Court adopted trial court’s memorandum of decision, which Appellate Court appended to its decision. I didn’t read the trial court’s decision, but here’s what I gleaned from the Appellate Court’s: Apparently Tedesco’s pension plan loaned money to a limited liability company composed of Agolli and some others. The company secured the loan with mortgages on company property. Agolli seems to have claimed that the people who had signed the loan documents for the company did not have a meeting of the minds with Tedesco, authority to bind the company, and were under duress. Trial court and Appellate Court rejected those claims.

Worker’s Compensation

Clements v. Aramark Corporation – Not sure I completely get this one. Worker fell and hit her head on the ground after fainting due to health conditions unrelated to her job. Commissioner and board denied benefits, concluding that injuries arose out of worker’s personal infirmity, not her employment. Appellate Court reversed, finding that worker’s injuries from falling at her workplace did arise out of her employment, even though the personal infirmity that caused her to fall did not.

Advance Release Opinions – April 27

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Reviews of the Appellate Court’s advance release opinions about deed restrictions, divorce, foreclosure, and governmental immunity and procedure.

Deed Restrictions

Jepsen v. Camassar – Long, fact-specific opinion about modifying restrictions in a deed conveying beach rights to all of the property owners in a subdivision. Trial court ruled that modification was valid. Appellate Court reversed and remanded with direction to render judgment declaring modification invalid, finding that: (1) association failed to give notice of the vote on the modification to all who were entitled to notice; and (2) the modifications were not approved by a majority of property owners as the deed required.

Divorce

Steller v. Steller – In modifying alimony, trial court properly determined that defendant’s earning capacity could be less than his current income because earning capacity is what defendant can be expected to earn in the future, not what he earns now. But, Appellate Court reversed because the evidence did not support the trial court’s determination of the amount of defendant’s earning capacity.

Foreclosure

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Melahn – Per curiam opinion. Trial court struck borrower’s counterclaims and special defenses and then granted bank’s motion for judgment on the counterclaims. Appellate Court dismissed the appeal as to the special defenses for lack of a final judgment, and affirmed the striking of the counterclaims, finding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that they were either legally insufficient or did not meet the transaction test. Appellate Court also affirmed the judgment on the counterclaim because borrower’s attempt to replead merely added conclusory statements to some of the counterclaims, and those additions did not correct the legal insufficiency.

Governmental Immunity and Procedure

Carter v. Watson – Governmental immunity barred inmate’s claims for money damages against Attorney General and four state employees, sued in their official capacities for failing to timely restore inmate to his proper status after an overturned drug test. Inmate’s claim for declaratory relief arising from the same incident was properly dismissed as moot since it did not fall within the mootness exception for matters capable of repetition, yet evading review.

Advance Release Opinions – March 23

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Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court’s advance release opinions about administrative law, civil procedure, contracts, deed restriction, governmental immunity, visitation, and worker’s compensation. I do not review the Court’s advance release opinions about criminal law and habeas corpus. I also do not review the Court’s per curiam decision affirming summary judgment for defendant in a spoliation of evidence and CUTPA case because there isn’t anything in the opinion to review (if you want to see for yourself, the case is Traylor v. Gambrell).

Administrative Law

Metropolitan District v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities – District is a municipal entity the legislature created in 1929 for water supply, waste management and regional planning. Commission is a state agency charged with enforcing statutes barring discrimination. District sought a declaratory judgment, injunction and writ of mandamus on allegations that Commission engaged in improper rulemaking and violated District’s due process rights regarding District’s alleged discriminatory hiring practices at issue in five proceedings before Commission. Trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that District could not yet pursue declaratory relief in Superior Court because it had to first seek that relief before Commission under CGS § 4-176, and it could not yet seek that relief before Commission because three of the five discriminatory hiring claims were still pending before Commission. Appellate Court also confirmed that the exhaustion requirement applied even when challenging Commission’s jurisdiction; the exception for futility or inadequacy of administrative remedy did not apply since there was no showing of futility or inadequacy; and the exception for due process claims under 42 USC 1983 did not apply because lack of an adequate legal remedy remains a condition to injunctive relief even when claim is made under that statute.

Civil Procedure

Ryan v. Cassella – Plaintiff brought collection action against “Paul Cascella dba CIA Integrated Marketing Systems” and trial court entered a judgment for plaintiff on defendant’s failure to appear. In attempting to examine the judgment debtor, plaintiff learned that, though the marshal had served defendant at the correct address, defendant’s name was actually Cassella, with a second “s” instead of a second “c”, and that his company’s name was actually Integrated Marketing Systems, Inc., with an “Inc.” and without “CIA.” Trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to correct the names. After the trial court’s articulations, Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) judgment was against Cassella individually, not against his company, so that correcting the company name did not add a new party; (2) CGS § 52-123 gave the trial court the authority to correct the misspellings because correcting names did not substitute a new party and neither party was prejudiced; (3) the four month limit for opening judgments did not preclude the trial court from correcting the misspellings; (4) trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to open and vacate the trial court’s decision on the motion to correct.

Contracts

Micek-Holt v. Papageorge – Lease-to-buy contract blew up for landlord-seller when tenant-buyer failed to close – in 2011 – but remained in the property without paying anything. Trial court ordering a closing on certain terms, and failing that, judgment to enter for plaintiff extinguishing defendant’s property interest, quieting title in plaintiff, and requiring defendant to pay $150/day use and occupancy. Appellate Court affirmed in a per curiam decision essentially adopting the trial court’s reasoning.

Deed Restriction

Bueno v. Firgeleski – A 1941 deed included a restrictive covenant limiting construction on the property to one house, within specified setbacks, and only if approved by grantor or his successors. Plaintiffs acquired the land in 2008, intending to subdivide into two lots – one for their own home and one for development. The deed into plaintiffs contains the restriction. Trial court declared the restrictions unenforceable because (1) its purpose had been frustrated by a permanent and substantial change in circumstances; (2) it had been abandoned by lack of enforcement; and (3) it benefits no land. Appellate Court affirmed, rejecting defendants’ claims that (1) the evidence did not support certain of the trial court’s factual findings; and (2) the trial court improperly went beyond the four corners of the deeds in interpreting them and misapplied the substantial change of circumstances test.

Governmental Immunity

McCarroll v. East Haven – Child fell from the ladder of a playscape at kindergarten allegedly because of a missing or loose bolt securing one of the rungs. Trial court granted defendant summary judgment, finding that the identifiable victim-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity did not apply because although the child was in identifiable class of victims, the harm was not imminent absent evidence that the missing or loose bolt was apparent to East Haven. Appellate Court affirmed, noting that “[w]hether the bolt was missing or loose, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the probability of the child being injured was so high that the defendant had a clear and unequivocal duty to act to prevent harm.”

Visitation

Nassra v. Nassra – Supervised-visitation provider started collection action in small claims court to recover unpaid fees. Small claims court found that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the action. Service provider then filed an appearance in the dissolution action and moved for an order of payment, which the trial court granted. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) service provider had standing because service provider had an oral contract with defendant and was injured when defendant did not pay; (2) six-year statute of limitations applied to the oral contract because the three-year statute applies only to executory oral contracts (neither party has fully performed and this oral contract was executed (service provider fully performed); and (3) trial court acted within its discretion in ordering defendant to pay service provider.

Worker’s Compensation

Binkowski v. Board of Education – Students assaulted Teacher and injured her. Teacher sued Board, alleging that Board acted “willfully and maliciously,” and intentionally inflicted emotional distress, by instituting a policy that led to the assault because it denied assistance to teachers confronted by violent and disruptive students. Trial court struck the complaint because it did not allege conduct to bring the action within an exception to worker’s compensation exclusivity. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that the complaint failed to allege conduct to bring her claim into the intentional tort exception under either the actual intent standard or the substantial certainty standard.