Connecticut Appeals

Advance Release Opinions - Review and Analysis

Matrimonial Issues

Analysis and Impact of Connecticut Appellate Level Opinions Involving Matrimonial Issues

Advance Release Opinions – March 9

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The Connecticut Supreme Court advance released an opinion about redistributing an asset of the marital estate after a divorce judgment, which I review below.

Divorce

Reinke v. Sing – CGS § 46b-86(a) precludes a trial court from modifying an estate distribution unless one of the exceptions in CGS § 52-212a, or some other exception, applies. Here, the parties both consented to modifying the judgment to redistribute the husband’s pension entirely to the husband. Since that is one of the § 52-212a exceptions, the trial court had the authority to open and modify. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court confirmed that § 46b-86(a) is not subject matter jurisdictional, but rather a restriction on the court’s authority to act. Since it is not subject matter jurisdictional, the fact that § 46b-86(a) does not authorize the court to redistribute the estate does not prevent the court from doing if some other statute authorizes it.

Advance Release Opinions – March 9

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The Connecticut Appellate Court advance released opinions about family law and judicial disqualification, which I review below. The Appellate Court also advance released opinions about two criminal and one habeas corpus matter, which I do not review.

Family Law

Zilkha v. Zilkha – In this child custody and visitation matter, the Appellate Court rejected defendant’s claims that the trial court (i) improperly delegated it judicial function and failed to consider public policy and the children’s best interests in giving the children considerable control over defendant’s access to them; (ii) improperly denied defendant’s motions to modify custody and visitation by relying on events that happened between 2004 and 2007, which he claimed trial court had earlier indicated were too remote and insufficiently weighty; (iii) improperly adopted recommendations of the children’s guardian ad litem, whom he claimed acted as an attorney for the children instead of a guardian ad litem; and (iv) improperly based its decision on what he claimed was an erroneous factual finding that the reconciliation therapist had ended reconciliation therapy.

Judicial Disqualification

Carvalhos Masonry, LLC v. S and L Variety Contractors, LLC – After trying the case, but before rendering a decision, the trial court suggested that the parties stipulate to a judgment for a specific amount. Plaintiff accepted the trial court’s suggestion; defendant rejected it. Three weeks later, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision finding for plaintiff in the exact amount of its settlement suggestion. Appellate Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court should have disqualified itself from deciding liability and damages after its failed attempt to convince the parties to stipulate to a judgment because of the concern that rejecting the court’s suggestion may result in retributive sanction or judicial displeasure.

 

Advance Release Opinions – January 10

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The Connecticut Supreme Court advance released an opinion about divorce law, which I review below. The Court also advance released an opinion about termination of parental rights, which I do not review.

Divorce Law

Cohen v. Cohen – If Dan v. Dan affects you, seems like you should read this case. In 2012, trial court granted defendant’s motion to reduce alimony because his income had substantially decreased. In 2015, trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to increase alimony because defendant’s income had substantially increased. Supreme Court affirmed in a four part opinion. First, Supreme Court agreed with defendant that, when considering “substantial change in circumstances” and in fashioning a modified order, the trial court’s task was to compare 2015 income with income at the time of the 2012 modification, not at the time of the original alimony order. But, Supreme Court found that’s what the trial court did and, even if the trial court had improperly considered income at the time of the original order, it was harmless error because the trial court would have reached the same conclusion if it had considered income at the time of the 2012 modification. Supreme Court also found that trial court did not impermissibly consider the purpose of the original alimony award instead of the purpose of the 2012 modification when ordering the 2015 modification. Rather, once the trial court concluded that the circumstances justifying the 2012 modification no longer existed, the purpose of the original award controlled and the trial court was bound to consider it. Second, the Supreme Court rejected defendant’s claim that plaintiff’s motion was “legally insufficient” because it did not allege that the 2012 modification did not fulfill the purpose of the original award or some exceptional circumstance. The motion was sufficient because it alleged a substantial change in circumstances. There has never been a requirement to specify in the motion all of the reasons why the change in circumstances justifies a modification. Third, Supreme Court rejected defendant’s claims that trial court should not have (i) considered parol evidence of the parties’ intent when they entered into the separation agreement that became the original decree; or (ii) taken judicial notice of the plaintiff’s 2002 financial affidavit. Parol evidence was necessary to clarify the purpose of the alimony provision in the separation agreement. And, the court always has the power to take judicial notice of the court file. In this case, the 2002 affidavit was relevant to determining the purpose of the original alimony award. Fourth, Supreme Court rejected defendant’s claim that the 2015 modification was an “impermissible lifetime profit sharing award.” Though alimony ordinarily does not allow the supported spouse to share in the supporting spouse’s post-divorce good fortune, the parties can vary that by agreement, which they did in this case.

Advance Release Opinions – December 1

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The Supreme Court advance released an opinion in a criminal case that I review below. The Appellate Court advance released opinions about civil procedure, family law, indemnification, and vexatious litigation that I review below. The Appellate Court also released three opinions in criminal matters which I do not review.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Criminal Law

State v. Damato-Kushel – I don’t normally review opinions in criminal cases but this one is a little different. The defendant was accused of sexual misconduct. Her alleged victim brought this writ of error, claiming that he, either personally or through his attorney, had a constitutional right under the victim’s rights amendment to be present during plea negotiations and other in-chambers pretrial disposition conferences between the prosecutor, the court and defense counsel. Supreme Court dismissed the writ, concluding that the alleged victim has no right to attend because the defendant herself has no right to attend. A concurring opinion notes that even though the defendant has no right to attend, her attorney does and the majority did not explain why the same right is not extended to the alleged victim’s counsel. The reason is that the language of the victim’s rights amendment does not allow it.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Civil Procedure

Law Offices of Frank N. Peluso, P.C. v. Cotrone – This case confirms, if we didn’t already know it, that failure to follow proper procedure can really ruin your day. Law firm sued former client for unpaid legal fees. Former client counterclaimed. Law firm filed a withdrawal of its action. Two days later, law firm filed what it thought was a withdrawal of its withdrawal. Trial court rejected former client’s argument that you can’t withdraw a withdrawal. Case went to trial. Law firm won on its claim and the counterclaim. Appellate Court reversed the judgment on law firm’s claim because you can’t withdraw a withdrawal. You have to move to restore the case to the docket within four months of the withdrawal. Painful lesson.

Family Law

Kent v. DiPaola –  Trial court did not include the present value of Spouse 2’s pensions (which were in pay status) in the division of assets because it used the income stream from the pensions to eliminate what would have been Spouse 1’s child support obligation. Trial court divided the martial assets two-thirds / one-third in favor of Spouse 2. Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the pensions from the marital asserts because the income offset Spouse 1’s support obligation. Nor was there any abuse of discretion in the property division.

Indemnification

O’Brien v. New Haven – Plaintiff was the city’s tax collector. A third party sued plaintiff for misconduct. Plaintiff asked city to defend him. City declined but said that it would indemnify plaintiff under CGS § 7-101a(b) for financial loss, including attorney’s fees, if plaintiff won the case and was acting in the discharge of his duties. Plaintiff hired his own lawyer and won. City refused to pay his attorney’s fees. Plaintiff filed a notice of intention to bring an action for indemnification with the city clerk and commenced the action soon after. City claimed that notice was late. Trial court found that notice was proper and timely; plaintiff was entitled to his attorney’s fees in defending against the misconduct claims; but plaintiff was not entitled to his attorney’s fees in prosecuting the indemnification action. Plaintiff and city appealed. After some extensive statutory analysis, Appellate Court agreed that the notice was proper and timely. Appellate Court also agreed that plaintiff was not entitled to his attorney’s fees in the indemnification action because there was no statute or contract authorizing it.

Vexatious Litigation

Rockwell v. Rockwell – In the underlying action, wife sued husband on an investment agreement and lost. Husband then sued wife and wife’s attorney for vexatious litigation. Wife was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Husband claimed a jury. After bifurcating the issue since it involved a question of law, the trial court found that there was probable cause to commence the underlying action and entered judgment for attorney. Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that trial court did not abuse discretion in bifurcating the probable cause issue; husband did not have a constitutional right to have the jury decide that issue; and trial court properly determined there was probable cause for the underlying action.

 

Advance Release Opinions – October 27

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Connecticut Appellate Court

The Appellate Court advance released opinions in the areas of family law, foreclosure and sanctions.

Family Law

Bruno v. Bruno – Quite a saga. Three rulings. First, since the Appellate Court had earlier reversed trial court orders reducing alimony and setting a valuation date for a financial account, trial court did not exceed its authority on remand by eliminating the interest originally awarded based on the orders the Appellate Court had reversed. Second, the trial court did not make a mistake in determining the start dates or the rate for the new postjudgment interest awards. Third, trial court properly held defendant in contempt because the violated order was clear and unambiguous.

Garvey v. Valencis – The statute providing for an emergency ex parte custody order – CGS § 46b-56f – does not require the court to allow the respondent to be heard prior to ordering emergency relief. Nor does the statute require the court, having ordered emergency ex parte relief, to complete a hearing within 14 days; the statute just requires that a hearing be scheduled, not completed, within 14 days.  Even though the hearing was not complete until some 112 days later, the original ex parte order did not expire after 30 days under Practice Book § 4-5 because following each day of the hearing the trial court found good cause for the ex parte order to remain in place.

Ray v. Ray – Contrary to plaintiff’s claim, the record shows that the trial court did find defendant’s net salary in making a child support determination and properly awarded the presumptive minimum support.

Spencer v. Spencer – Agreement that alimony terminated on “cohabitation” did not require defendant to prove that the cohabitation was romantic or sexual. Unclean hands is not a recognized basis for declining to terminate alimony based on cohabitation and, even if it were, defendant did not have unclean hands.

Foreclosure

U.S. Bank National Association, Trustee v. Blowers – Because the parties never reached a binding mortgage modification, the trial court properly struck counterclaims and special defenses based on conduct occurring during modification negotiations and foreclosure mediation as not having a sufficient nexus with, or relating to, the making, validity, or enforcement of the note or mortgage. In his dissent, Judge Prescott explained that he thought the trial court too narrowly construed and applied the making, validity, or enforcement test and failed to construe the counterclaims and special defenses in a light most favorable to upholding their legal sufficiency.

Sanctions

Emerick v. Glastonbury – Trial court properly dismissed action based on self-represented litigant’s conduct during trial. This one is worth reading if only to get the details of what the trial judge had to deal with.

Advance Release Opinions – October 6

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Connecticut Appellate Court

The Appellate Court advance released opinions about foreclosure, matrimonial, personal injury, professional negligence, receivership and trusts and estates matters.

Foreclosure

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Essaghof – Borrower originally had a negative amortization adjustable rate note and claimed that lender fraudulently or with unclean hands induced a modification to a fixed rate by misrepresenting that interest rates were rising when they were actually falling. The trial court rejected borrower’s claim, concluding that interest rates were in fact rising leading into the modification even if they fell after the modification. The trial court also ordered borrowers to reimburse lender for real estate taxes and hazard insurance lender paid during pendency of appeal and until the conclusion of litigation. Appellate Court affirmed.

Matrimonial

Puff v. Puff – Parties resolved a post-dissolution motion to modify alimony with a stipulated agreement that the court approved as an order. Appellate Court rejected plaintiff’s claims that (i) there was no “agreement” that could be accepted as an order – there was only an agreement to agree; and (ii) the trial court did not conduct an adequate canvass before accepting the agreement as an order. But the Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s contempt order for plaintiff’s failure to comply with a term of the agreement/order, finding it unwarranted since it was undisputed that plaintiff had made “at least some effort” to comply.

Personal Injury

McFarline v. Mickens – Trial court granted defendant summary judgment, finding that municipality had not shifted responsibility for sidewalk maintenance to adjoining landowners so, absent proof of a positive act by landowner that contributed to plaintiff’s fall on allegedly defective sidewalk, landowner did not owe plaintiff any duty.  Appellate Court affirmed.

Professional Negligence – What it is Not

Pellet v. Keller Williams Realty Corporation – Homeowners sued realtor on a host of contract and tort claims about realtor’s conduct in selling house. Trial court equated all eight counts of the complaint with professional negligence and directed verdict for realtor because homeowners did not present expert testimony as to the professional standard of care. Trial court also granted realtor’s motion for a special finding that homeowners brought the action in bad faith and without merit, which entitled realtor to its attorney’s fees. Appellate Court reversed the judgment and special finding, concluding that (i) rolling an allegation about what realtor knew or should have known about house’s market value into all eight counts did not make all eight counts professional negligence claims; (ii) the jury was actually provided with necessary expert testimony as to the standard of care even if it did not come from homeowners’ witness and did not expressly opine a breach of the standard; and (iii) special finding could not stand in the face of the other rulings.

Receivership

Seaport Capital Partners, LLC v. Speer – Receiver appointed in a nine-property commercial foreclosure action brought writ of error challenging trial court’s denial of approval of receiver’s reports and order of payment. Appellate Court rejected receiver’s claim that trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to appoint a receiver because lender never fully funded the loans. Not surprisingly, Appellate Court also rejected receiver’s claim that the order of payment was improper because the underlying borrower had collected certain rents and so receiver did not have the money to comply with the order of payment.

Trusts and Estates

Eder’s Appeal from Probate – This case is really only interesting because its name seems archaic. Appellate Court noted that the case had been captioned Eder v. Appeal from Probate in the Superior Court and that on appeal the parties had called it Eder v. Eder. Appellate Court changed it to Eder’s Appeal from Probate to “conform[ ] to the convention our appellate courts use for appeals from probate.” In any event, the gist of the appeal was that father had set up a trust that upon termination was to be distributed equally to “each child of the [father] then living.” Father and biological son had a falling out. Father later adopted the two adult sons of a woman with whom he had had a long term relationship. Biological son claimed it was a sham adoption undertaken solely to reduce his share of the trust corpus. Probate Court concluded adopted sons were entitled to share equally with biological son. Same result in Superior Court. Appellate Court affirmed.

Advance Release Opinions – September 22

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Connecticut Appellate Court

The Appellate Court issued advance release decisions about civil protection orders, family law, and personal injury (but really appellate procedure).

Civil Protection Order

Sabrina C. v. Fortin – Civil protection order entered. On appeal, defendant claimed that trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to vacate or modify the protection order; (2) changed the basis for its denial in its subsequent articulation; (3) awarded plaintiff her attorney’s fees under the bad faith exception to the American Rule; and (4) granted plaintiff’s motion for a one-year extension of the protection order. The Appellate Court “agree[d] with the defendant’s third and fourth claims, and, accordingly, … remand[ed] the matter to the trial court with direction to vacate the award of attorney’s fees and to vacate the order extending the civil protection order to November 24, 2017.”

Family Law

Mason v. Ford – Defendant moved for postjudgment modification of child support to zero based on loss of income. Trial court modified support to zero, effective retroactively to a date preceding defendant’s service of the motion to modify, and found a 16 week arrearage terminating on the retroactive effective date. Defendant appealed. Appellate Court reversed, finding that under CGS § 46b-86(a) the retroactive effective date could not be earlier than the date of service of the motion to modify, and remanded to recalculate the arrearage.

Personal Injury (but really appellate procedure)

Pecher v. Distefano – Defense verdict in an action for personal injuries plaintiff sustained when she fell off her horse during a riding lesson. Plaintiff appealed claiming that trial court committed harmful error in improperly admitting a release and hold harmless agreement, and a picture of a sign, purporting to relieve defendant from liability. The Appellate Court concluded that plaintiff had failed to carry her burden of presenting an adequate record for the Court to review her claim that she was harmed by the allegedly improper evidentiary rulings.  More specifically, the Court explained that a harm determination requires, among other things, evaluation of the relationship of the improper evidence to the central issues in the case, particularly as highlighted in closing arguments. This evaluation is done in the context of the totality of the evidence. Since plaintiff did not provide the Appellate Court with the totality of the evidence or the closing arguments, the Appellate Court could not conduct a full and complete analysis of harm and had to affirm.

 

Advance Release Opinions – August 31

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Connecticut Appellate Court

Medical Malpractice

Simmons v. Weiss – First judge dismissed medical malpractice action for failure to file a written opinion of a similar healthcare provider. More than four months later, plaintiff filed a motion to open the dismissal. Second judge concluded that first judge’s dismissal was improper because complaint included a claim for lack of informed consent, which did not require a written opinion of a similar healthcare provider. Second judge opened the dismissal as to the lack of consent claim. Appellate Court reversed, concluding that no exception to the four month limitation on opening judgments applied, including the equitable exception because the judgment did not “shock the conscience.”

Divorce

Dejana v. Dejana – Postjudgment motion for contempt for failure to pay the correct amount of unallocated alimony and child support under separation agreement incorporated into dissolution judgment. At the time of judgment, defendant had three sources of income: base salary, bonus and a stock incentive plan. Settlement agreement gave plaintiff a percentage of base salary and bonus and gave defendant the right to use stock incentive plan to pay for the minor child’s college education. After defendant fully paid for the education with the stock incentive plan, plaintiff claimed that “bonus” included the stock incentive plan such that defendant could pay tuition from the plan only after paying plaintiff her share. Trial court denied the claim. Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that the separation agreement unambiguously excluded the stock incentive plan from the unallocated alimony and child support calculation.

Lugo v. Lugo – Postjudgment motion to modify child custody. Trial court awarded sole custody to plaintiff. Defendant appealed, claiming lack of due process because there was insufficient notice of a claim for, or that the court might award, sole custody to plaintiff. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that defendant had sufficient notice that custody was in issue.

Pendente Lite Awards Cannot Distribute Assets

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The advance release opinion in this Connecticut appeal (Dumbauld v. Dumbauld) confirms that pendente lite alimony and child support cannot result in a distribution of assets.

The trial court found that defendant was drawing on an account to cover his family’s living expenses because his salary was insufficient. The court ordered him to continue paying the living expenses plus additional amounts for pendente lite alimony and child support. The court also ordered defendant to pay “all postsecondary education expenses” for the two college age children (one was attending American University, the other Barnard College).

“[T]he defendant moved for clarification of the court’s decision and moved to open and reargue the court’s decision, claiming that the orders exceeded his ability to pay.” The trial court denied both motions. Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court reversed.

Defendant’s Main Arguments on Appeal

“The defendant claim[ed] that the court improperly ordered alimony pendente lite in excess of his net income … and impermissibly required him to use assets in order to meet his obligations.”

“The defendant [also] claim[ed] that the court erred in ordering him to pay all college education costs for the two children in violation of General Statutes § 46b-56c, which limits education support orders to the amount charged by the University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student.”

Pendente Lite Awards Cannot Distribute Assets

The Appellate Court noted that under Supreme Court precedent a trial court can order that alimony be paid out of assets where the trial court finds “that the alimony payor had not accurately represented his financial situation and made a specific finding as to either imputed income or earning capacity.”

“In the present case, the trial court made no finding that the defendant’s testimony was not credible, or that he had income or earning capacity that he had failed to disclose. It made no finding of imputed income ….” Consequently, “[t]he key issue in the present case is whether the court had the power in a pendente lite alimony order to order payment of alimony out of assets, which amounted to a distribution of marital property.”

The power of a court to transfer property from one spouse to another comes only from an enabling statute. General Statutes § 46b-81 empowers a court, “[a]t the time of entering a decree . . . dissolving a marriage . . . [to] assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of the other.” In contrast, “[t]he pendente lite enabling statute, § 46b-83, … does not provide that the court may assign part of the estate of one party to the other, or otherwise suggest that property distribution is permitted.”

“On the basis of our comparison of §§ 46b-81 and 46b-83, we conclude that distribution of property is not authorized by § 46b-83…. If a court orders the use of assets to pay pendente lite alimony, it decides the issue of property distribution before it is statutorily authorized to do so. We conclude that the trial court’s order in the present case, given its specific factual findings and the absence of a finding of imputed income or lack of credibility, amounts to an impermissible pendente lite property distribution.”

Education Support Orders are Limited by Statute

Section 46b-56c(f) provides that any amount awarded for educational “expenses shall not be more than the amount charged by The University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student”, unless the parties agree otherwise.

Plaintiff claimed “that the parties had entered into a stipulation that the defendant would pay the full costs, as permitted by § 46b-56c(f).” In the stipulation, entered on the record three months prior to the hearing on pendente lite alimony, defendant agreed to make “tuition payments [to the children’s respective colleges], which are past due and are needed to be made so they can complete the year ….” The parties agreed that the stipulation as to the tuition payments (and some other payments defendant agreed to make) was “without prejudice to either party in the sense that neither party will be held to have made an evidentiary or judicial admission that the sums paid or the source of the payments or the mechanism of the payment, binds either party as being an appropriate sum, or that it is based upon the underlying claims of either of the parties as to income, assets, or liabilities.”

The Appellate Court concluded that the stipulation “clearly refers to a onetime payment; the parties specifically stipulated that this payment would
not serve as an admission, and would not be binding on either party…. By ordering that the defendant pay the full education costs under these  circumstances, the trial court violated § 46b-56c, which limits an educational support order to the amount of in-state University of Connecticut
tuition.”

Other Things to Note

Judge Beach issued a concurring opinion. He thought that pendente lite alimony could require the invasion of principal if, for example, that’s what the parties had been doing to cover their expenses prior to commencement of the divorce action. That’s what the parties had done in this case. Judge Beach concurred in the remand because the trial court was going to have to revisit the pendente lite awards in any event and the trial court might have abused its discretion as to the alimony amount.

 

Issuing State’s Law Governs Child Support Duration

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issuing-state-law-governs-child-support-durationThe issuing state’s law governs child support duration where a party seeks to modify the child support order in another state. The Connecticut Supreme Court reached this conclusion in Studer v. Studer to be officially released on February 23, 2016.

In this Connecticut appeal, plaintiff and defendant were divorced in Florida in 2002. The Florida judgment “provided that the defendant would pay child support until the child ‘reaches the age of [eighteen], become[s] emancipated, marries, dies, or otherwise becomes self-supporting’ or ‘until [the] age [of nineteen] or graduation from high school whichever occurs first, if a child reaches the age of [eighteen] and is still in high school and reasonably expected to graduate prior to the age of [nineteen].’ Both parties were aware that the child was autistic at the time of the dissolution and the Florida judgment specifically referenced the child’s condition.”

The parties and the child moved to Connecticut. In 2003, defendant domesticated the Florida judgment in Connecticut and moved to modify child support and alimony. The Connecticut court granted the motion.

In 2010, plaintiff moved for postmajority support, claiming that the child would not graduate from high school until after her 21st birthday because of her autism. “Applying Florida law, the [Connecticut] court granted the plaintiff’s motion for postmajority support and ordered the defendant to continue paying child support until the child’s high school graduation ….”

In 2013, before the child graduated from high school, plaintiff moved to extend child support indefinitely beyond the child’s high school graduation. “The trial court concluded that under General Statutes § 46b-71, Florida law controlled the duration of the defendant’s child support obligation and ordered the defendant to pay child support indefinitely.”

Defendant appealed. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed.

Defendant’s Main Argument on Appeal

Florida allows postmajority support in cases like this; Connecticut law does not. Defendant’s main argument was that the 2010 postmajority support order, issued by the Connecticut court, became the operative support order rendering all further support considerations subject to Connecticut law.

Supreme Court Concludes Issuing State’s Law Governs Child Support Duration

The Supreme Court thoroughly discussed all of the arguments and counter-arguments but to me the decision came down to one simple thing: The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act provides that the issuing state’s law governs child support duration. More specifically, one section of the act, CGS §46b-213q(d), “provides in relevant part: ‘In a proceeding to modify a child support order, the law of the state that is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of the obligation of support. . . ‘” (Supreme Court’s emphasis).

The term ‘‘initial controlling order’’ is not defined in § 46b-213q, nor is it defined in the provision setting forth the definitions used within the act, General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 46b-212a. ‘‘In the absence of a definition of terms in the statute itself, [w]e may presume . . . that the legis- lature intended [a word] to have its ordinary meaning in the English language, as gleaned from the context of its use. . . . Under such circumstances, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.’’

The court considered a number of dictionary definitions of “initial.” The court concluded: “Using the definition of ‘initial’ indicates that the legislature and the drafters of the uniform act intended for the first state that issues a child support order to control the duration of the child support obligation.”

Accordingly, because it is undisputed that the Florida judgment was rendered before any of the Connecticut orders, the initial controlling order in the present case is the Florida judgment and, therefore, Florida law governs the duration of the defendant’s child support obligation. Furthermore, the parties in the present case do not dispute that Florida law provides for support for adult disabled children.

In reaching this conclusion, the court quoted a Washington Supreme Court decision, as follows: “Child support orders are frequently modified as children grow older or when circumstances change. . . . If the [uniform act] ceased to apply after the first modification, the reference to the state that issued the initial controlling order would be superfluous.’’

The court also noted that if “initial controlling order” did not refer to the first child support order issued in the case, there would be incentive to forum shop, which is something the Act was intended to prevent.

Other Things to Note

In footnote 8, the court noted that at oral argument plaintiff agreed that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act applied and CGS § 46b-71 did not. For this reason, the court didn’t consider § 46b-71.

About the Photo

I’ve used it before. Seems appropriate for child support and custody issues.