The Connecticut Appellate Court concluded that a defamatory statement must be specially alleged in the complaint to be considered on summary judgment. In this Connecticut appeal, Stevens v. Carlton Hemming, to be officially released on February 23, 2016, defendants were appointed receiver of plaintiff’s oil company after he left unfulfilled hundreds of prepaid consumer heating oil contracts. Plaintiff filed a bankruptcy petition. “[D]efendants audited the business’ accounts and found instances where the plaintiff had apparently used corporate funds for personal expenses.” Defendants “filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court … alleging that the plaintiff had committed corporate waste.”
A newspaper “article quoted [defendant] as stating, ‘We have not done sufficient work yet to present it in court, but I don’t have any doubt that probably 99 percent would stand up, and that we’d probably find more.’ The plaintiff refer[red] to this statement as the ’99 percent comment.’ The article stated that Helming said that the business ‘paid the various amounts listed in the proof of claim over different periods, from one year to up to five years.’ The plaintiff refers to this as the ‘one to five year allegation.'”
“[P]laintiff filed a complaint against the defendants, in which he alleged that the 99 percent comment and the allegations in the proof of claim were defamatory. He did not plead that [defendant] defamed him by making the one to five year allegation.”
“[D]efendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that [defendant]’s statements were absolutely privileged; the statements were opinions protected by the fair comment privilege; the allegedly improper statements were not defamatory as they did not ascribe any improper conduct to the plaintiff; and the allegedly unprivileged statements were substantially true.” Plaintiff opposed and defendants replied. Plaintiff then filed a sur-reply memorandum alleging that defendant had defamed him by making the one to five year allegation.
“The [trial] court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in regard to the 99 percent comment on the grounds that it was an opinion on a matter of public concern protected by the first amendment, and was protected by the qualified privilege of fair comment.” The court did not consider the one to five year comment.
The Appellate Court affirmed.
Plaintiff’s Only Argument on Appeal
Plaintiff’s only claim on appeal was “that the trial court improperly declined to consider the one to five year allegation when it granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.”
Appellate Court Concludes Defamatory Statement Must be Specially Alleged
The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court properly declined to consider the one to five year comment because plaintiff did not allege it in his complaint. In response to plaintiff’s claim that the modern trend, which Connecticut follows, allows for a broad reading of pleadings, the court said: “This trend … is not a panacea for every instance where a party fails to adhere to the basic procedural requirements of pleading, especially in the context of a defamation complaint.” The court noted in a footnote that, “[a]lthough this court has not addressed the issue, we find persuasive the reasoning of various Superior Courts in requiring specificity in pleading defamation.”
The court ultimately concluded, as follows: “The trial court, in ruling on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, was limited to the facts alleged in the complaint standing alone, which cannot fairly be read to encapsulate the one to five year allegation. Simple fairness requires that a defendant not be forced to defend against facts that are not clearly pleaded in a complaint. Thus, we conclude that the court did not err in declining to consider the plaintiff’s claim as to the one to five year allegation.”