Attorney Discipline

Attorney Discipline

D’Attilo v. Statewide Grievance Committee – D’Attilo started an action in Superior Court (1) seeking a writ of mandamus directing local grievance panels to reverse their dismissals of grievance complaints that D’Attilo had filed against five lawyers; and (2) asking Superior Court to oust the Statewide Grievance Committee and take control of grievances still pending against two other lawyers. Superior Court dismissed the action for lack of standing because D’Attilo was neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved. Supreme Court affirmed, adopting Superior Court’s memorandum of decision.

Worker’s Compensation

Callaghan v. Car Parts International, LLC – Prior to 2011, if an injured worker recovered from a third-party, the employer was entitled to be reimbursed from that recovery for any worker’s compensation benefits that the employer had paid to the injured worker. If any of the recovery remained after reimbursing the employer, the employer enjoyed a “moratorium” on payment of benefits in the future, up to the amount of the remaining recovery. In 2011, the legislature amended the statute, CGS § 31-293(a), to provide that one-third of any recovery from a third-party “shall inure solely to the benefit of the employee.” In other words, the employee is entitled to one-third of any recovery from a third-party. The question on appeal was whether the moratorium applied to that one-third. The Supreme Court confirmed that it does not. The employee gets to keep the one-third regardless of whether the employer pays any future benefits.

Reviews of Connecticut Supreme Court advance release opinions about attorney discipline and trespass.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Hickey – In 2008, Hickey voluntarily resigned from the bar and waived his right to seek reinstatement. But in 2012, he nonetheless applied for reinstatement, saying that the waiver did not preclude a present determination of his present fitness to practice law. Disciplinary counsel moved to dismiss the application because of the waiver. The motion to dismiss still had not been acted on as of 2014, when Practice Book § 2-53(b) was amended to provide that an attorney who resigns and waives reinstatement is ineligible to apply for reinstatement. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in 2016, concluding that the addition to § 2-53(b) was retroactive since it was really a codification of existing practices and procedures. Supreme Court affirmed, finding that § 2-53(b)’s retroactivity was irrelevant because an attorney’s voluntary resignation and knowing and intentional waiver of the right to seek reinstatement rendered the attorney permanently ineligible to seek reinstatement under the common law. Supreme Court also found that trial court had the authority to dismiss the application without referring it to the standing committee because the court determines eligibility to apply for reinstatement, and the committee determines the fitness to practice of those eligible to apply.

Trespass

Firstlight Hydro Generating Company v. Stewart – Stewart has a house on Candlewood Lake. He wanted to add some things to his yard, and that required doing some things on the Utility’s property. Utility (I’m not sure if it’s an official utility but that’s the best word to describe it) gave him permits for some limited work. He did more than he was allowed. Trial court ordered Stewart to remove everything (including the hot tub) that was not authorized by the permits. Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the trial court properly determined that Stewart’s improvements were in fact on the Utility’s property, and the scope of its order was not an abuse of discretion.

Attorney Discipline

Advance Release Opinions – Supreme Court – July 27